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INTRODUCTION
The advent of the "Information Superhighway" has sparked much
speculation about the roles of authorship, of readership, and of literary
property in the vast system of interlinked computer networks that has
come to be known as "cyberspace."1 Through computers linked to a digi-
tal network, users can access and add to vast quantities of material. At
* Morton L Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law. Copyright 1995,Jane C. Ginsburg. This Article is based in part
on the Robert S. Appel Distinguished Lecture in Law and Technology, delivered at the
University of Denver College of Law, March 23, 1995.
Many thanks for substantive suggestions to Professor Shira Perlmutter, Professor Marci
Hamilton and Steven Shaber, Columbia Law School class of 1996; thanks for research
assistance toJustine Harris, Columbia Law School class of 1996.
1. See, e.g., L Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 993 (1994);Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
LJ. 29 (1994); David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information
Systems and Systems Operator Liability, 3 Alb. LJ. Sci. & Tech. 79 (1993); Raymond T.
Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Copyright on the Information Superhighway Requiem
for a Middleweight, 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 25 (1994). On the creation of works in digital
media, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Some New Kinds of Authorship Made Possible by
Computers and Some Intellectual Property Questions They Raise, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 685
(1992); Robert D. Sprague, Multimedia: The Convergence of New Technologies and
Traditional Copyright Issues, 71 Deny. U. L. Rev. 635 (1994); Jennifer D. Choe, Note,
Interactive Multimedia: A New Technology Tests the Limits of Copyright Law, 46 Rutgers
L Rev. 929 (1994).
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least in theory, every computer user can become his, or her own pub-
lisher, and every terminal can become a library, bookstore, or audio and
video jukebox.
The prospect of pervasive audience access to and ability to copy and
further disseminate works of authorship challenges the traditional roles
not only of information providers-be they publishers, motion picture
producers or record producers 2-but of the individuals who create the
works. On the one hand, authors will be able to disseminate their works
directly to the entire world of online users. On the other hand, this kind
of dissemination ensures neither payment nor the security that users will
not copy, alter, or further circulate the author's work. Does the "Infor-
mation Superhighway" put the author in the driver's seat, or will the au-
thor become, as Garrison Keillor has warned, "the deer in the headlights"
of a vast traffic the author cannot control?3
While circulation in cyberspace may place works of authorship at the
risk of uncontrolled copying or adaptation, the works have first to be
made available for digital exploitation. As a result, MortJanklow, a lead-
ing literary agent, offers a more hopeful prediction than Keillor's. The
entrepreneurs of cyberspace still depend on the participation of authors:
as Janklow puts it, "they've got the highway, but I've got the cars."4 That
is, one can build the highway, but it does not follow that the cars will
choose to come. Unless they can become author-friendly, digital media
may remain just that: media, without content. Today's travellers on the
infohighway are largely (although by no means exclusively) the bicycles
and tricycles of e-mail exchanges, and the tractor trailers of enormous
data compilations. If all kinds of works of authorship, particularly those
of intense creativity and imagination, are to embark willingly on the
cyber-road, then authors require some assurance that the journey will not
turn into a hiacking.
But if cyberspace threatens authors' ability to control the exploita-
tion of their works, it also offers them new opportunities for creation. By
facilitating communication among creators and enhancing their ability to
2. A variety of local and international conferences have recently focused on the rights
and liabilities of information providers, publishers and producers in the digital era. See,
e.g., WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Future of Copyright and Neighboring Rights (on
file with the author) [hereinafter WIPO Louvre] (symposium held June 1-3, 1994 at the
Louvre); WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Impact of Digital Technology on Copyright
and Neighboring Rights, Mar. 19, 1993 (on file with the author) [hereinafter WIPO
Harvard] (symposium held Mar. 31-Apr. 2, 1993 at Harvard University); Business and
Legal Aspects of the Internet and Online Services (Seminar held Sept. 14-15, 1995 in New
York).
3. Remarks at Panel Discussion, Session III, Conference on Intellectual Property
Rights and the Arts: The Impact of New Technologies 43 (Dec. 13, 1994) (transcript on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (sponsored by The New York International Festival of
the Arts).
4. Interview with Morton L. Janklow, Janklow, Nesbit & Associates, at Columbia Law
School (Oct. 25, 1994).
19951 1467
COLUMBIA LAW REVEW
disseminate the fruits of their labors, cyberspace may promote new
modes of authorship, particularly of a collaborative kind. Today's casual
e-mail exchanges may become tomorrow's multimedia productions, as
many widely scattered contributors together elaborate works combining
words, images, and/or music. This Article therefore analyzes the copy-
right law consequences of creation as well as of exploitation of works in
cyberspace. Moreover, because cyberspace knows no national borders,
the evaluation of both topics necessarily takes into account foreign as well
as domestic U.S copyright law.
This Article will address three broad problems: first, who owns the
copyright in works created on the infohighway?; second, what rights do
the copyright owners of these works-as well as of pre-existing works
posted in cyberspace-enjoy?; and third, how may they enforce their
rights? Because the law in this area is far from settled, the analysis cannot
be purely descriptive; the conclusions offered here are often proposals
derived from my analysis of the available elements of positive copyright
law. Finally, two premises underlie this analysis. First, in applying or
adapting copyright law to issues of copyright ownership and exploitation
in cyberspace, I am claiming that copyright law properly does.apply, or
can successfully be adapted, to digital creation and communication of
works of authorship. Thus, I do not believe that the digital format of the
works, or their networked dissemination, radically undermines the bases
of copyright laws conceived in an analog world.5
Second, in articulating and examining the issues from the point of
view of authors and copyright owners, I am claiming that fostering au-
thorship remains a primary goal of copyright law, whatever the medium
in which works are created and disseminated. It is true that cyberspace
vastly enhances the power of users of works: it not only makes works avail-
able to individual users more easily and in greater volume than in the
hard copy world, but also communicates them in an easily manipulated
format that users can instantly recopy, adapt, or forward to other users.
Nonetheless, the perspective of user rights, albeit important, should re-
main secondary. Without authors, there are no works to use.6 Copyright
law has maintained the balance between encouraging authorship and en-
lightening the public; as the Copyright Clause of the Constitution de-
5. For the opposite proposition, see, e.g., Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 1, at 32
(arguing that existing scope and nature of copyright protection are poorly attuned to new
milieu of information highway); see also Thomas Dreier, Copyright Digitized:
Philosophical Impacts and Practical Implications for Information Exchange in Digital
Networks, in WIPO Harvard, supra note 2, at SDT/15, 27 (exploring strains put on
traditional copyright concepts when digital media provoke the "dissolution" of the work of
authorship).
6. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quoting
ULonel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 Copyright
L Symp. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971)) ("If every volume that was in the public interest could be




dares, the "Progress of Science" is "promote [d]" by "securing for limited
Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings."
7
I. WHO OWNS THE COFRIGHT IN THE "CARS"?
Some of the problems posed by electronic networks concern com-
munication and protection of previously created works. These works
present no problems of copyright ownership specific to cyberspace: tradi-
tional copyright principles can identify their authors or initial copyright
owners.8 For example, the author of a hard copy photograph that has
been scanned and uploaded to a network does not cease being the work's
sole author simply because the work's format or mode of communication
has changed.9 Cyberspace can raise novel copyright ownership questions,
however, with respect to works wholly or partially created on electronic
networks. Participants in bulletin boards and "chat lines,"10 or users of
electronic mail, can together create works of authorship through multi-
ple online exchanges. The number and location of the participants can
be as vast as the number of bulletin board or chat line subscribers, or,
even more broadly, as the number of persons with access to e-mail.
Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that an author writes
the beginning of a short story, which she posts on an electronic bulletin
board, inviting any and all participants to compose endings for the tale."
In due course, hundreds of writers respond. The initiating author would
now like to publish her beginning, as joined to her favorite fifty conclu-
7. U.S. Const. art. i § 8, cl. 8.
8. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Domestic and International Copyright Issues
Implicated in the Compilation of a Multimedia Product, 25 Seton Hall L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 105, 113-16, on file with the Columbia Law Review
(outlining traditional copyright principles and describing how they can be applied to
problems posed by electronic networks).
9. Moreover, the person effecting the scanning would not be considered the "author"
of the digital version, since she would have vested no independent creativity in scanning
the photo. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 857 (1976) (simply transforming the medium in which a work is expressed-in
that case converting a cast iron "Uncle Sam" bank to a plastic version-is not an act of
authorship).
10. Electronic "chatting," which allows users to have conversations over the internet
essentially in real time, is technically described as "messaging between nodes on a network.
When your computer connects with a host on a LAN [local area network], the host sends a
login prompt to which your computer responds so that the connection can be made."
Tom Fahey, Net.Speak: The Internet Dictionary 35 (1994).
11. The hypothetical is inspired by an old-technology event: in 1876, Mark Twain
wrote a story titled "A Murder, A Mystery and A Marriage." He proposed to the Atlantic
Monthly "that a number of other famous writers of the period.. . be enlisted, each to write
his own final chapter for the work, so that for the mystery set up in the first few chapters,
each author would compose a solution, in addition to, or in competition with Twain's own
denouement. In other words, as planned by Twain, there was to be a common plot for the
story, with a number of different endings." Chamberlain v. Feldman, 89 N.E.2d 863,




sions, which she has assembled and edited. Moreover, she hopes to do so
free of any copyright claims of the fifty selected contributors. Who owns
what rights under copyright in the story and its components?
A. Joint Works
Classifying this work affords a starting point for determining its copy-
right ownership. The collaborative nature of the work might make the
Copyright Act's "joint work" category the most apt for the story with all its
endings.12 The Copyright Act defines a "joint work" as "a work prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."' 8
Our compendium of endings seems to fit that standard: those who re-
sponded to the initiating author's invitation surely intended to merge
their endings to her beginning, as did she intend to combine her begin-
ning with their endings.
One might object that the completed stories should not be consid-
ered joint works unless the participants collaborated together in space or
time, or unless each participant knew whom the others were. But even
before the infohighway, joint works did not necessarily imply temporal
and spacial proximity. For example, in the "old" days, a composer might
have written a melody, hoping and intending that, at some later date, a
lyricist would come along and supply the words. In this instance,
although the authors did not work together toward their goal (indeed,
the authors may never have met or corresponded), both sought to create
a work that would combine words and music.14 While the 1976 Copyright
Act emphasizes the intent of the authors at the time their respective con-
tributions were made,' 5 it does not require that that intent be simultane-
ously expressed. The legislative history of the Act in the House and Sen-
ate Reports envisions two situations giving rise to a joint work: (1) "the
authors collaborated with each other," or (2) "each of the authors pre-
pared his contribution with the knowledge and inten It] ion that it would
be merged with the contributions of other authors as 'inseparable or in-
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The work would most likely not be considered a
"work made for hire," see infra note 26.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
14. Or suppose the composer had no intent regarding the pairing of her tune with
words, but a lyricist nonetheless joined a text to the tune. The lyricist certainly intended to
create a work that was "joint" in the sense that he bound the words and music together.
The Second Circuit, in a much criticized decision under the 1909 Act, held that the intent
of the subsequent author sufficed to qualify the combined work as "joint." See Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir.), modified on
rehearing, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (the "12th Street Rag" case). The primary basis for
the criticism of this decision, however, is the lack of the first author's intent to create a
joint work, rather than the belatedness of the second author's contribution.
15. See S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976).
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terdependent parts of a unitary whole.' "16 While collaboration implies
simultaneity of intent, the other example from the committee reports, of
contributions created with the intent that they be merged, arguably ac-
commodates the hypothetical composer awaiting a lyricist, as well as our
initiating author and her cyber-collaborators.
However, the legislative history suggests that, while the co-authors
need not actually meet and work together, they must not only intend, but
must also be aware of each other's contributions. For there to be not
only an "intention[ ] at the time the writing is done" to combine the
parts, 17 but also the knowledge (or at least the reasonable expectation)
that the contributions will be merged, it would seem that each contribu-
tor's intent must be fairly contemporaneous.' 8 Even so, our initiating
author may satisfy the statutory criteria of joint authorship. When she
posts the opening of her story on the electronic bulletin board, she does
not know who will come along to complete it, but she can be reasonably
certain that someone (or many someones) will respond. Moreover, to
enhance her knowledge of the contributions she intends to merge with
her own, she can at all times monitor the progress of her invitation, and
thus watch the collaboration unfold. As a result, even though their con-
tributions are serial rather than simultaneous, all the contributors (in-
cluding the initiator) know, before each begins, that their efforts will
form "inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."
As the co-owner of a "joint" work, the initiating author would be enti-
fled, under U.S. law, to exploit the work on a nonexclusive basis without
obtaining her co-authors' permission.' 9 However, she could not grant
third parties exclusive rights without the co-authors' permission. More-
over, absent a contract to the contrary, any nonexclusive exploitation in
which the initiating author engages gives rise to a duty to account to her
co-authors.20 Accounting for profits among fifty co-authors could prove
cumbersome-and relatively unprofitable. 21 Moreover, under some for-
eign copyright laws, joint authors may not individually exploit the joint
work, even on a nonexclusive basis, without obtaining all the co-authors'
accord. 22 Thus, the rights afforded to the co-authors under copyright's
16. S. Rep. No. 473, supra note 15, at 103; H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 15, at 120.
17. S. Rep. No. 473, supra note 15, at 103; H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 15, at 120.
18. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 473, supra note 15, at 103 ("although a novelist, playwright,
or songwriter may write a work with the hope or expectation that it will be used in a
motion picture, this clearly is a case of separate or independent authorship rather than
one where the basic intention behind the writing of the work was for motion picture use.").
19. See, e.g., Werbungs und Commerz Union Austalt v. LeShufy, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1153, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing M. Nimmer, Copyright § 6.10 (1987)).
20. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1984); Jerry Vogel Music
Co. ir. Miller Music, 74 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427-28 (App. Div. 1947), aff'd, 87 N.E.2d 681, 681
(N.Y. 1949).
21. Moreover, the other joint authors may, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, exploit the initiating author's contribution.
22. See, e.g., C. Prop. Intell. art. L. 113-3 (1992) (Fr.); Law No. 633 for the Protection
of Copyright and Other Rights Connected With the Exercise Thereof art. 10 (1981) (Italy),
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joint works regime are significantly constrained, both in the U.S. and
abroad. But these limited rights reflect only the basic framework: the
initiating author may alter that arrangement by contract. Our next in-
quiry therefore addresses cyberspace assignments of copyright, and the
extent to which they comply with copyright law requirements.
B. Transfers of Exclusive Rights Under Copyright
To enjoy maximum freedom to dispose of the collection of stories,
our initiating author would like to obtain assignments of all of the con-
tributors' copyright interests. (This would be true whether the contribu-
tors were considered co-authors of each story, co-authors of the whole
collection, or individual authors of their distinct story endings.) To this
end, suppose she includes the following notice when she posts the begin-
ning of her story and her invitation to others to finish the tale:
By contributing material to the completion of the story, you
thereby assign to me all your right, title, and interest, in and to
any copyright in your contribution, for the full term of copy-
right, and any renewals and extensions thereof. The territory
covered by this agreement shall be the whole world. The laws of
the United States and of the State of New York shall govern this
agreement.
Is the notice-which is a sort of cyberspace analog to the "shrinkwrap
license" of software distribution fame23-effective to transfer the contrib-
utors' copyrights?
The U.S. Copyright Act provides that authors may transfer their
rights under copyright in whole or in part, but that a grant of exclusive
rights must be made in an "instrument of conveyance, or a note or mem-
orandum of the transfer" "in writing and signed by the owner of the
reprinted in 2 Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Italy: Item 1, at 2 (UNESCO
Supp. 1992) [hereinafter Copyright Laws of the World]; Law Amending the Federal Law of
Copyright, arts. 12-13 (1981) (Mex.), reprinted in 2 Copyright Laws of theWorld, supra,
Mexico: Item 1 at 2-3.
23. A "shrinkwrap license" is an adhesion contract that purports to take effect when
the consumer opens the package and retains the goods. In the computer software area,
shrinkwrap licenses typically claim to have transferred possession, but not ownership, of a
copy of a computer program to the purchaser, subject to a variety of conditions
concerning permissible copying or adaptation of the work. See, e.g., cc:Mail Program
License Agreement (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Opening this package and/
or using this program indicates your acceptance of the terms and conditions stated
below... cc:MalI, Inc. grants you a non-exclusive license to use this software product
For legal commentary on copyright and shrinkwrap licenses, see, e.g., David L. Hayes,
Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 15 Hastings Comm. &
Ent. L.J. 653 (1993); David W. Maher, The Shrink-Wrap License: Old Problems in a New
Wrapper, 34J. Copyright Soc'y 292 (1987); Richard H. Stem, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of
Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. LJ. 51 (1985); see also Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Technology, 939




rights conveyed."24 While the notice may be a writing sufficient to meet
the Copyright Act's formal requirements, where is the signature? In the
absence of authority recognizing online assents as equivalent to signed
writings,25 our initiating author may not be able to rely on the medium of
cyberspace to secure the necessary contracts. Rather, she may have to
resort to paper mailings (or faxes) to and from her contributors. 26
On the other hand, the notice may suffice to transfer nonexclusive
rights in the contributions. The Copyright Act does not require nonex-
clusive grants to be in writing; rather, they may be made orally, or in-
ferred from the parties' conduct.2 7 Thus, suppose the initiating author
posts a notice stating her intention to compile and publish the results of
her invitation, and further providing that participation in the story consti-
tutes permission to publish, without payment to the contributors, their
contributions as part of the collected results. In that case, a nonexclusive
license from the contributors can reasonably be inferred. Moreover, the
license, stated to be royalty-free, would absolve the initiating author of
any duty to account to the contributors. In this respect, the nonexclusive
license solves some of the problems inherent in the basic joint works
regime.2
8
24. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
25. Cf. David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data
Communications Onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and
Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 487, 491 (1993) (posing, but not answering,
the question of what should constitute a signature in cyberspace). See generally Bernard
D. Reams, Jr. & LJ. Kutten, Electronic Contracting Law 162-64 (1994) ("Until the
legislature takes action, electronic signatures, passwords and algorithms may not meet the
signature requirements of courts of law."); Benjamin Wright, The Law of Electronic
Commerce EDI, FAX and E-Mail: Technology, Proof, and Liability § 16.4.4.2 (1991) (Part
V "Electronic Contract Issues") (discussing application of UCC § 2-201 signing
requirement to electronic transactions).
26. For the same reason, the initiating author may not succeed in characterizing the
collection as a "work made for hire," of which the initiating author would be the
"employer" and initial holder of all rights under copyright. While the collection of stories
would be a compilation or a collective work, to which a specially ordered or commissioned
contribution can be a work made for hire, the Copyright Act further requires that there be
a writing, signed by both the initiator and the contributor, stating that the contribution will
be considered a work made for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Moreover, the writing should be
executed before the work is undertaken. See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp.,
969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992). But see Playboy v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir.
1995) ("ETihe writing requirement of § 101(2) can be met by a writing executed after the
work is created, if the writing confirms a prior agreement, either explicit or implicit, made
before the creation of the work.").
Finally, any purported transfer of exclusive rights or of authorship status may be
ineffective, or at least insecure, as to. contributors under the age of capacity to contract-as
many participants in cyberspace communications are likely to be.
27. See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1103 (1991).
28. Both the joint works and the nonexclusive license regimes avoid another potential
impediment to dissemination of the collection, the 1976 Act termination right. Under
§ 203(b), a grant of exclusive rights made after 1977 may be terminated by the grantor (or
1995] 1473
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C. Copyright Ownership of a Compilation
Having concluded that the initiating author can at least assert nonex-
clusive rights in the contributions, and therefore may insulate herself
from infringement claims of the contributors,29 we should inquire
whether the initiating author also enjoys any exclusive rights of her own.
While she is not a copyright owner of the various endings taken individu-
ally,30 she is the author and thus the copyright owner of her beginning,
and moreover, of her assembly of the beginning with the endings. That
is, assuming she has engaged in a minimally original selection and ar-
rangement of the contributed endings, the resulting collection enjoys its
own copyright as a "compilation."31 The owner of the copyright in a
compilation holds exclusive rights in the reproduction and public display
(among other rights) of the work, as edited by its compiler.3 2 The compi-
lation copyright does not extend to the compiled elements, but only to
their collective presentation. 3 This means that the initiating author may
protect her collection against total or substantial copying, but would have
no claim against a third-party who excerpted one or a few endings.
The above analysis, while made under U.S. copyright law, would be
essentially the same under many foreign copyright laws. As a general
matter, the initiator and compiler of a "collective work," such as a newspa-
per or an encyclopedia, enjoys exclusive rights in the work in its collective
presentation, but is not the initial copyright owner of the various contri-
butions making up the work.s4
her statutory successors) thirty-five years after the grant was made. If the grant is
terminated, the grantee may no longer exploit the work in its original form (although she
may continue to exploit derivative works prepared under the authority of the grant). By
contrast, there is no termination right of a nonexclusive grant, nor may co-authors
terminate each others' rights. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. This conclusion also depends on the validity in foreign jurisdictions of the notice's
choice of law provision. If, under foreign law, the notice was not recognized as a contract,
or if the choice of law clause was rejected, then it would be necessary to inquire whether,
under the law of that jurisdiction, the notice, or the participants' conduct, gave rise to or
permitted an inference of a nonexclusive royalty-free license.
30. The statute defines a copyright owner as an owner of any exclusive right under
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
31. See id. §§ 101, 103; Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see
also Council of the European Communities, Common Position on Directive on the Legal
Protection of Databases, 7934/95, PI 40, Culture 56, Codec 72, art. 3.1 (June 21, 1995)
(standard of originality required for protection of databases by draft European Union
database directive).
32. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 106.
33. See id. § 103(b); Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49.
34. See, e.g., C. Prop. Intell. art. L. 113-2 (1992) (Fr.); Law No. 633 for the Protection
of Copyright and Other Rights Connected with the Exercise Thereof arts. 3, 7 (1981)
(Italy), reprinted in 2 Copyright Laws of the World, supra note 22, Italy: Item 1, at 2; Law
Amending the Federal Law of Copyright arts. 12-13 (1981) (Mex.), reprinted in 2
Copyright Laws of the World, supra note 22, Mexico: Item 1, at 2-3; Law No. 22/1987 on
Intellectual Property art. 8 (1987) (Spain), reprinted in 3 Copyright Laws of the World,
supra note 22, Spain: Item 1, at 4.
1474 [Vol. 95:1466
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So, our initiating author is a copyright owner, but is her legal owner-
ship of certain exclusive rights in the compilation at all meaningful in a
networked environment? For that matter, is any author's or other propri-
etor's copyright ownership-whether of new works created on digital net-
works, or of pre-existing works posted to a network-meaningful? Will
authors and copyright owners be happy surfers in cyberspace, or will they
"wipe out" in the "third wave information age"? To address this question,
we will review the exclusive rights comprehended in a copyright, and
their application to electronic network communications. Finally, if our
initiating author's copyright still has content, how can it be enforced, and
against whom? This question prompts inquiry into the copyright liability
of the bulletin board service or online operator that carries the infringing
material.
II. RIGHTS UNDER COPYMGHT IN CYBERSPACE
Copyright is often referred to as a "bundle of rights."35 It includes
the exclusive rights to reproduce the work in copies, to prepare derivative
works based on the copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the work,
and to perform or display the work publicly.3 6 All of these rights can
come into play in a networked environment. Moreover, in principle, the
rights copyright confers will be the same whatever the format of the work,
whether originally created in hard copy or in digital format, including, as
in the case of our initiating author, works created in whole or in part on
digital networks.3 7 As a result, the following discussion applies not only
to our initiating author, but to authors of all kinds of works, however
originally elaborated, whose works are made available on digital
networks. 38
35. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976); Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also, e.g., C. Prop. Intell. art. L. 122-1-122-3 (1992) (Fr.);
An Act Dealing With Copyright and Related Rights, § IV.3 (1990) (Germany), reprinted in
2 Copyright Laws of the World, supra note 22, Germany: Item 1, at 3; Copyright Law of
1970 art. 79, 80 (1989) (Japan), reprinted in 2 Copyright Laws of the World, supra note 22,
Japan: Item 1, at 20; Law No. 22/1987 on Intellectual Property, ch. I, § 2 (1987) (Spain),
reprinted in 3 Copyright Laws of the World, supra note 22, Spain: Item 1, at 5-7.
37. Section 102(a) of the CopyrightAct, one of the 1976 revisions, poses the principle
of the indifference of the medium (whether "now known or later developed") in which the
work is expressed. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 35, at 52:
it makes no difference what the form, manner or medium of fixation may be-
whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures or any other graphic or
symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and
whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device
'now known or later developed."
38. The one exception is sound recordings; these works do not currently enjoy the
full scope of copyright protection, since there is no exclusive public performance right in a
sound recording, and the reproduction and derivative works rights are limited to acts of




Copies of a work are made not only when the online user stores a
work to a hard or floppy disk, or prints it out, but also when a temporary
copy is received in the memory of her computer.3 9 The "reproduction is
created within the computer memory to make the work accessible by
means of the computer."40 Thus, simply accessing a work online impli-
cates the reproduction right, even if the user does not make a more per-
manent copy on a hard or floppy disk.
Does this mean that every reader of online material is by definition a
copyright infringer?41 Not necessarily, since the access may have been
permitted, depending on the circumstances under which the reader ob-
tained the material. Muth material distributed over the Internet is made
available for free (or on a share-ware basis42); accessing, and even storing
currently pending to recognize a public performance right in digital transmissions of
sound recordings. See H.R. 1506, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 227, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
39. Electronic distribution entails the making of "copies" within the meaning of the
1976 Copyright Act, at least as amended in 1980, when Congress adopted the
recommendations of the Commission on New Technological Uses (CONTU). Under the
CONTU approach, a "copy" is made when a work in machine-readable form is received
into the computer's temporary memory. See Report of the Commission on New
Technological Uses, quoted in Robert A. Gorman &Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the
Nineties 692-94 (4th ed. 1993) [hereinafter CONTU Report]. This approach is the
premise for § 117 of the U.S. Copyright Act, and has been followed in the European
Union. See Council Directive 91/250, art. 4(a), 1991 OJ. (L 122) 42. U.S. courts have also
applied this principle. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
517-18 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994); Advanced Computer Servs. v.
MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 362-64 (E.D. Va. 1994) (unauthorized loading of a
program into computer's temporary memory held to create an infringing copy); Telerate
Sys. Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (unauthorized remote access to
database; receipt of data in unauthorized user's computer held to create a copy). Thus, to
receive an electronic distribution is to make a copy, even if no further, more permanent,
copy follows. See generally Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property
and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights 64-66 (1995) [hereinafter NII White Paper].
However, several commentators have questioned or even strongly criticized the
proposition that receipt in a computer's random access memory entails making a "copy."
See, e.g., David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles: The Case of the Evanescent Copy, Am.
Lawyer, May 1995, at 108, 103-04 (questioning); Litman, supra note 1, at 40-43
(criticizing); Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report,
Communications of the ACM, December 1994, at 21, 22-23 (criticizing).
40. CONTU Report, supra note 39, at n.164.
41. See generally Litman, supra note 1, at 40 (criticizing the Nil White Paper, supra
note 39, on the ground that it would confer on copyright owners the "exclusive right to
read").
42. Share-ware is defined as:
A form of software distribution that makes copyrighted programs freely available
on a trial basis; if you like the program and use it, you are expected to register
your copy and send a small fee to the program creator. Once your copy is
registered, you might receive a more complete manual, technical support, access
to the programmer's bulletin board or information about upgrades. You can
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it can come within the scope of the creator's implicit or explicit license to
the readers. Material distributed by commercial online services such as
CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy, may carry charges; the serv-
ices' subscriber agreements or other notices generally specify the condi-
tions of access and permissible copying. By contrast, material acquired by
"hacking" into an online service and accessing without permission would
be obtained in violation of the copyright law (as well, potentially, as of
other laws 43).
One might object that even if mere accessing of electronic docu-
ments is "copying," it is, at least initially, done by private individuals for
their personal enjoyment. Many if not most users who access online doc-
uments simply to view them do not seek to compete with the copyright
owner by commercializing or engaging in further reproduction and dis-
semination of the document. Indeed, whether the "copy" resides tempo-
rarily in a computer, or is created or stored in a more permanent me-
dium, including in hard copy, pursuit of individual copyists seems both
unfeasible and distasteful. One might therefore expect copyright law to
exclude from the copyright owner's control purely personal, noncom-
mercial copying.
While the U.S. has not traditionally included a general "private copy-
ing" exception of this kind,44 many European countries have.45 However,
the entire concept of "private copying" makes little sense in a world
where the work is predominantly marketed directly to the end user.
Much copying in cyberspace will be "private," because intermediaries,
such as traditional publishers (and booksellers and librarians) who
reproduce, package and distribute copies to end users, will no longer be
download share-ware from many bulletin boards including CompuServe and it is
often available from your local user group.
Peter Dyson, The PC User's "essential accessible" Pocket Dictionary 468 (1994).
43. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1988). Hackers have also been prosecuted
under wire fraud statutes, and under provisions regarding the interstate transport of stolen
goods, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988). See, e.g., U.S. v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
See generally Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers:
Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35JurimetricsJ. 1
(1994).
44. See, e.g., Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted in Study
No. 14 for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Studies
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1960); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 465-66
(1984) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
45. See Latman, supra note 44, at 24-29 (study prepared for U.S. Copyright Office
concerning fair use in U.S. and related doctrines abroad). See generally Gillian Davies,
Private Copying of Sound and Audio-visual Recordings (1984) (study of many countries'
laws regarding private copying).
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necessary.46 As a result, the market for, or "normal exploitation of," the
work will by and large be the private copying market.
47
The supplanting of traditional distribution of copyrighted materials
by private copying represents the end point on a continuum that has
been evolving since the introduction of the photocopier and the audi-
otape recorder in the 1960s. These technologies first undermined, and
then eradicated, the premise underlying private copying exemptions:
that private copying would be laborious and economically insignificant.
48
In Europe, the diffusion of these technologies has led legislators to limit
the exemption, or, in some cases, to eliminate it altogether.
49
By contrast, in a U.S. controversy concerning the dissemination of
technologies facilitating private copying, the Supreme Court employed
46. Thus, there has been much speculation that certain kinds of publishing,
particularly of academicjournals, will be supplanted by direct communications of scientific
articles over the Internet. See, e.g., Andrew M. Odlyzko, Tragic Loss or Good Riddance?
The Impending Demise of Traditional Scholarly Journals, 42 Notices of the Am.
Mathematical Soc'y 49 (1995) (arguing that the growth in size of scholarly literature
combined with the growth of electronic technology will result in the disappearance of
traditional scholarly journals and their replacement by online versions). Thanks to my
colleague Gerry Neuman for giving me this article. See also Eugene Volokh, Cheap
Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale L.J. 1805, 1807.(1995) ("Control over what is said
and heard will shift from intermediaries... to speakers and listeners themselves.").
47. Cf. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as revised at Paris onJuly 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, art. 9.2, S. Treaty Doc. No.
99-27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention] (member countries
may "permit the reproduction of [literary and artistic] works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work").
48. See, e.g., Copyright Law of 1941, art. 68 (1981) (Italy), reprinted in 2 Copyright
Laws of the World, supra note 22, Italy- Item 1, at 10 ("The reproduction of single works
or of portions of works for the personal use of readers, when made by hand or by a means
of reproduction unsuitable for circulating or diffusing the work in public, shall be free.").
49. When the copies generated by these new means of reproduction began to
compete with purchases of copies of the works, European legislators permitted private
individuals to make copies, but imposed a variety of private copying levies on the
machinery and/or media of reproduction, and provided for distribution of the levies to
the authors, producers and performers of the musical and audiovisual works captured by
audio and video tape recorders. See, e.g., C. Prop. Intell. art. L. 1224-122-5 (1992) (Fr.);
An Act Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights art. 68 (1990) (Germany), reprinted in
2 Copyright Laws of the World, supra note 22, Germany: Item 1, at 10-11; Law No. 22/
1987 on Intellectual Property art. 25 (1987) (Spain), reprinted in 3 Copyright Laws of the
World, supra note 22, Spain: Item 1, at 5-7; Royal Decree No. 287, of Mar. 21, 1989
(Spain), reprinted in 3 Copyright Laws of the World, supra note 22, Spain: Item 2E, at 1
(regulating "Compensatory Remuneration for the reproduction for personal use of books,
phonograms and videograms by means of non-typographical technical apparatus).
Finally, in the case of computer programs, the European Commission's 1991 Directive
to harmonize the copyright laws of the European Union's member countries precludes
private copying, except for the making of a backup copy by "a person having the right to
use the computer progrm... insofar as it is necessary for that use." Council Directive 91/
250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 5.2, 1991 O.J. (L
122) 42, 44. Presumably, if the software copyright owner includes a backup disk in the
software package sold, then the user has no right to make her own backup disk.
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both implied license and economic insignificance justifications to create
a limited private copying exception. In the "Betamax case," the Court
considered whether "time-shifting"-videotaping TV programs for de-
ferred viewing and subsequent erasure-by individual VCR owners con-
stituted copyright infringement. The Court held that because the public
had been "invited to witness... [the programs in their] entirety free of
charge," copying them for time-shifting purposes was a "fair use" of the
copyrighted works.50 Particularly significant to the Court's analysis was its
perception that time-shifting was not likely to have a negative impact on
existing or potential markets for the copied work.
Applying the "Betamax" criteria to online documents, if the docu-
ment is made freely available for copying in the first place, it is not neces-
sary to inquire whether private copying was fair use: fair use excuses
prima facie infringements, 51 and where the copying was permitted, there
is not even prima facie infringement. However, if the document is avail-
able only through a commercial online service, then the public is not
"invited to [view it] ... free of charge," and copying it, even temporarily
(as in time-shifting) has a much weaker claim to being fair use. This is
especially true if, as anticipated, private copying adversely affects the "po-
tential market for or value of the copyrighted work."5
2
While the market impact justification for exempting private copying
from the scope of an author's exclusive rights may be out of place in
cyberspace, a different justification may still apply-impracticality of en-
forcement. Because the issue of enforcement of rights in cyberspace ex-
tends beyond the problem of private copying, however, we will defer that
inquiry until we have examined the application of other exclusive rights
in cyberspace.
B. Public Performance and Display Rights
Disseminating works over electronic networks also calls into play the
copyright owner's public performance and display rights. The Copyright
Act defines a public performance or display to include the following
conduct:
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display
of the work.., to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the per-
formance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.53
50. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
51. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994) ("[Flair use is an
affirmative defense."). See generally William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright
Law 385-402 (1985) (study of history, policy, and implementation of the fair use defense).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Act also provides: "To 'transmit' a performance or display is
to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond
the place from which they are sent." Id.
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Thus, if an online reader of our initiating author's collection of variously-
ended stories were to forward the collection to a mailing list of mystery
lovers, the transmission could be both a public display and a reproduc-
tion. A reproduction would occur in the temporary memories of the re-
cipients (as well, potentially, as in the memories of their e-mail servers5 4 ).
The forwarding to the mailing list would be a public display by means of
transmission if its recipients constituted "the public." The Copyright Act
does not define "the public," but it does provide that a work is performed
or displayed "publicly" if it is performed or displayed "at any place where
a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered."55 One might therefore inquire if the
mailing list comprises "a substantial number of persons outside a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances." Some might contend that
in the "global village" of cyberspace, the entire community of network
users-or if not all users, then at least the users of a given bulletin board
service-would be considered "a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances." However, even acknowledging that cyberspace can pro-
mote a kind of friendship and perhaps even familial feeling among corre-
spondents who do not otherwise know each other, the potential "circle"
of networked acquaintances is too capacious to fit the statutory definition
or intent.5
6
Is simply posting a work on a network, without directly sending it to
members of the public, also a "public performance or display"? Once the
work is posted, members of the public with access to that network are
"capable of receiving the performance or display.., in separate places
and at the same time or at different times."57 While the users will not
receive the performance or display until they call the work up, the text of
the Copyright Act provides for disjunction in times of receiving the pro-
gram. Case law involving more rudimentary technologies illustrates the
point. In On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries,58 a fed-
eral district court held that a hotel video system through which guests
could electronically order the transmission of videocassette motion pic-
tures to the televisions in their rooms "publicly performed" the movies,
even though no film would be sent to more than one room's television at
a time. The video service had contended that the serial (rather than si-
multaneous) nature of the transmissions removed them from the cate-
54. A "server" is "[a] specialized network device of software that provides a service to
other devices. The most common services on a LAN are printer servers, file servers and
mail servers." Tom Fahey, Net.Speak: The Internet Dictionary 164 (1994). A "mail server"
is "[a]n application that distributes email items in response to requests." Id. at 119.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
56. Cf. H. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 15, at 64 ("One of the purposes of the
definition [of public performance] was to make clear that . . . performances in
'semipublic' places such as clubs, lodges, factories, schools are 'public performances'
subject to copyright control.").
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
58. 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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gory of public performances. However, the court applied the Copyright
Act's definition to hold that the transmissions were made "to the public"
(the hotel's clientele was "the public") in different places (different
rooms) at different times.
There is one difference between transmitting a work via a hotel video
system and posting a work in cyberspace. At the hotel, each time a guest
ordered a film, the hotel's system sent it directly to the guest; in our hypo-
thetical, the person who posts the material leaves it to the network to
send the material on. Thus, the public performance would be directly
attributable to the network operator (or bulletin board service) rather
than to the individual poster.5 9 Nonetheless, one may argue from this
decision that placing the material in a system that makes it possible for
"the public" to receive it by deferred transmissions also "publicly per-
forms or displays" the work, or at least is a contributory infringement of
the public performance or display right.60 Arguably, the text of the Copy-
right Act does assume that the performance or display will in fact be re-
ceived by the members of the public: in the definition of public perform-
ance the members of the public "capable of receiving" the performance
do "receive" it. But the key element would seem to be making the per-
formance available for receipt. For example, even if no viewers tuned in
to a particular television broadcast, the unpopular transmission should
still be considered a public performance. Similarly, while it is possible
(even if unlikely) that no end user would choose to access a work posted
on a network, the result should be no different.6 '
C. Distribution Right
The Copyright Act also grants the author the exclusive right "to dis-
tribute copies.., of the work to the public by sale or the transfer of
ownership.. ."62 Disseminating a work on a digital network may not only
constitute a public performance or display by means of transmission,
63 it
might also be considered a distribution of copies, since the network serv-
ers and all those who access the work on the network receive "copies" of
the work in their computers." However, while a distributor of "hard"
copies must part with the physical object embodying the copy, a distribu-
tor of digital copies may cause new copies to be made in the servers' and
recipients' computers, all the while retaining her own copy. As a result,
59. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
60. See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). On
contributory infringement, see discussion infra text accompanying notes 80-85.
61. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1993) (defining "publication" as including the
"offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of
further distribution, public performance, or public display").
62. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988).
63. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
64. See discussion supra text accompanying note 39.
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there may be no "transfer of ownership" of the distributor's copy, and the
distribution right, as currently defined, may not be implicated.
The possible lack of fit between the statutory distribution right and
digital dissemination may not significantly undermine the author's copy-
right, so long as digital transmissions can be deemed public perform-
ances or displays. Nonetheless, there may be a practical reason to distin-
guish between digital performances or displays, and digital distribution of
copies: the author may license (or retain) rights separately. If the only
exclusive right pertaining to digital transmissions was the public perform-
ance/display right, then the holder of that right could block the holder
of the reproduction right from disseminating copies of the work over dig-
ital networks.
The Information Infrastructure Task Force, appointed by President
Clinton in 1998, has recently issued a report recommending amendment
of the Copyright Act65 to specify an exclusive right to "distribute copies
... to the public ... by transmission."66 The Task Force would also
supplement the definition of "transmit" by adding: "To transmit a repro-
duction is to distribute it by any device or process whereby a copy or
phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place from which it was
sent."67 This definition thus accomodates the distributor's retention of
her copy. The Task Force stresses, however, that "The proposed amend-
ment does not create a new right. It is an express recognition that, as a
result of technological developments, the distribution right can be exer-
cised by means of transmission-just as the reproduction, public per-
formance and public display rights may be."
68
To the extent that the proposed right of digital distribution simply
transposes to computer networks the traditional right to distribute (physi-
cal) copies of the work, the White Paper is correct that the right is not
"new." While the traditional right's subject matter focus on material cop-
ies makes little sense in a digital environment, the activity targeted (dis-
semination) and its result (consumers receiving copies) remain the same.
Nonetheless, the proposed right of digital distribution by means of trans-
mission underscores something that is new: because digital communica-
tion de-materializes copies, the same act can be analyzed as either (or
both) a reproduction or a public performance or display. For example,
an act which the user may perceive as a public performance, such as a
digital broadcast of a popular song, is also a transmission of copies to the
listeners' computers. An act which the user may perceive as a reproduc-
65. Bills based on this report have recently been introduced in both the Senate and
the House. See S. 1284, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
66. NII White Paper, supra note 39, at 218-20, app. 1 at 2.
67. Id. This definition could apply to transmissions by fax as well. While sending a
fax to one person or to a restricted group would not be a transmission of copies "to the
public," a mass faxing would be.
68. Id. at 213-14.
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tion, such as ordering the delivery of a document to her computer's
screen and memory, is also a public display by means of transmission.
The traditional reproduction/public performance distinction thus be-
comes increasingly elusive.69 In the short term, recognizing a right of
digital distribution of copies may assist grantees of the reproduction right
in resisting the competing claims of holders of the public performance
right. In the long run, however, in the digital world it may make most
sense to recharacterize the rights of reproduction, distribution, and pub-
lic performance or display as facets of a general right of communication
of works to the public.
70
D. Derivative Works Right
There is another right in the bundle-the right to prepare derivative
works71 -that might also be at issue in a variety of online circumstances.
The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as encompassing any "form
in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted."72 The derivative
works right thus covers all kinds of adaptations of the work of authorship,
including but not limited to sequels, spin-offs, dramatizations and transla-
tions. For example, our initiating author would control translation and
sequel rights in the collection of variously-ended stories, at least with re-
spect to the beginning of the story. If she is not the holder of exclusive
rights in the story endings, she would lack authority either to license or to
bring an infringement action against adaptations of that material. On
the other hand, adaptations of her contributions to the collection, for
example, of her selection, arrangement and editing of the endings,
would come within the scope of her derivative works right. Thus, if a
third party made a motion picture-or in cyberspace, posted a digital
video-based on a sequence of stories drawn from the collection, our
initiating author would allege violations of her exclusive rights to prepare
derivative works based on the beginning of the story, and based on the
sequence (selection and arrangement) set forth in the collection.
73 Simi-
larly, a sound recording of a reading of the stories, possibly together with
69. The prior version of the NIl White Paper, the "Green Paper," attempted to
maintain the distinction by dividing digital transmissions into those that were primarily
public performances, and those that were primarily reproductions. See Intellectual
Property and the National Information Infi-astructure: Preliminary Draft of the Report of
the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 121-23 (1994). This attempt provoked
widespread criticism, see Litman, supra note 1, at 30-31 & n.14 (noting that this approach
"drew nearly unanimous protest" at Green Paper public hearings), and the White Paper
abandoned the distinction.
70. See Paul Mallam, Copyright and the Information Superhighway: Some Future
Challenges, 6 Ent. L Rev. 234, 236 (1995).
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
73. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
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music or other sound effects, is also a derivative work,74 and would come
within our initiating author's copyright monopoly.
What if third-party entrepreneurs, rather than recording a reading of
the stories, which reproduces the literary work onto the audio format,
produced a sound recording omitting the stories' words, but supplying
appropriate musical and other sound effects, timed to complement the
user's own reading of the stories? Or what of illustrations produced to
complement the stories? While ventures of these kinds are improbable in
an analog world-who would buy a book, separately purchase illustra-
tions, and collate the two?-they may be quite feasible in a digital envi-
ronment. The user can easily integrate the text and the images and/or
the sounds, thus creating her own multimedia "derivative work" of which
the entrepreneurs will have supplied the components, without directly
producing the derivative work. One may imagine the development of a
substantial market for peripheral works annexed to, or to be used to-
gether with, the primary copyrighted work. Does this market come
within the copyright owner's control?
Where the third-party work "goes with" but does not itself reproduce
or alter the copyrighted work, no rights under copyright are implicated,
despite the economic dependence of the peripheral work on the primary
work.75 In our hypothetical, however, the user puts the two (or more)
works together to create a new derivative work. The case law addressing
this kind of situation is not plentiful, but it is divided. The two relevant
cases both involved additions to video games. In one case, the Seventh
Circuit held that the sale of a "Promblaster" circuit board designed to
enable the consumer to speed up the action of plaintiff's games yielded
unauthorized adaptations of the games and thus violated the derivative
works right.76 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the sale of "Game
Genie" video game "enhancers" that altered the action of Nintendo video
game characters did not create unauthorized derivative works.77 The
Ninth Circuit's holding turned on its determination that the altered
game had no "form" because the Game Genie could not itself produce an
audiovisual display: the display resulted from the interaction of the
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
75. See, e.g., H.RL Rep. No. 1476, supra note 15, at 62 ("To constitute a violation of
section 106(2), the infiinging work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in
some form; for example, a detailed commentary on a work or a programmatic musical
composition inspired by a novel would not normally constitute infringements under this
clause.") But see Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135
(N.D. Ohio 1986) (independently-produced audiotapes to be played inside "Teddy
Ruxpin" dolls held to violate derivative works right in the dolls); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v.
Veritel Learning Sys., 658 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (same); cf. Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (answer key to questions in high
school physics textbook held to infringe copyright in the textbook).
76. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Intl, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
823 (1983).
77. See Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
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Game Genie and the Nintendo video game cartridge.78 This formalistic
conclusioh is probably erroneous: in determining if the altered presenta-
tion is a derivative work, it should not matter whether the presentation
resides in a particular piece of hardware. The point is that the interac-
tion of the machines produces a variation of the game.79 Under the
Ninth Circuit approach, disseminating peripherals for users to combine
with copyrighted works would not infringe, while the result under the
Seventh Circuit's analysis portends less well for third-party entrepreneurs.
There is another approach to the problem of peripheral works
designed to permit the end user to create her own unauthorized deriva-
tive work. Dissemination of the peripheral works could be contributory
infringement: "One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, in-
duces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of an-
other, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer."80 Is the end
user's creation of an unauthorized derivative work "infringing conduct"?
Under the analysis set out earlier,8 ' just as "private" copying should not
(or should no longer) escape characterization as infringement merely be-
cause the copyist is an end user, so "private" adaptations should not enjoy
automatic exemptions from liability.
One might object that this analysis is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's determination in the "Betamax" case.82 There, the Court held
that the dissemination of a product (video recording equipment) that
can be used for infringing purposes is not contributory infringement if
the product is also "widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.
Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."
83
In that case, the "substantial noninfringing use" was "time-shifting" of
"free" broadcast television programs.84 The majority opinion did not ex-
plicitly address whether "librarying" the copy would also be fair use, but
the emphasis of its analysis was on the temporary nature of the copy.85
Here we are positing that the peripheral work has no substantial use
other than in connection with the targeted copyrighted work. Whether
that use is noninfringing may turn on two factual questions. First, was
78. Id. at 968.
79. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 15, at 62 (derivative works right is "broader
than" the reproduction right "in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or
phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime,
or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in
tangible form").
80. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
81. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
82. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
83. Id. at 442.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 451-55. By contrast, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion examined
both "time-shifting" and "library-building," and contended that neither was fair use. Id. at
483-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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access to the copyrighted work "free," or did the author or proprietor
impose conditions of payment and/or limitations on usage as part of the
work's dissemination? Second, analogizing to the "time-shifting"/
"librarying" distinction, is the user making a one time derivative work in
her computer's temporary memory, so that the adaptation will vanish
when she turns the computer off, or has she instead retained a copy of
the do-it-yourself adaptation?
8 6
These conditions should be cumulative. If the work is not "free," or
if the copyright owner has made the work available subject to the limita-
tion that users shall not make even temporary adaptations of the work,
then the "time-shifting" should not suffice to exculpate the adaptation.
Even if access to the work is "free," the creation of multiple (across the
universe of "private" adaptors) permanent adaptations interferes with the
copyright owner's exercise of her "exclusive" right to prepare derivative
works (although the copyright owner may certainly disclaim that right
when she makes copies available for free).
Thus, to return to the Game Genie, even if its producer was not a
direct infringer, distribution of a device whose sole purpose was to alter
the action of the Nintendo games should have made the producer a con-
tributory infringer. Nintendo did not distribute its game cartridges for
free, and for present purposes we may assume that if Nintendo distrib-
uted games online, it would not do so without placing payment and use
restrictions on that distribution. Because access to the games is subject to
charges and restrictions, "time-shifting" should not be a defense.
One might object that if all the copyright owner need do to insulate
itself from a fair use defense is to make clear that it is reserving all rights
to make derivative works, then the fair use defense becomes meaningless.
After all, the fair use defense trumps the copyright owner's claims to ex-
clusive rights, when the balance between the copyright owner's interest in
compensation and control and the public's interest in access to works of
authorship tips in the public's favor. Nonetheless, in this instance, the
making of even temporary adaptations could have a more severe eco-
nomic impact in cyberspace than in the analog world. Indeed, the Game
Genie example illustrates how "time-shifting" may adversely affect the
copyright owner's market for derivative works. In cyberspace it may be
very easy for consumers to assemble derivative works from the elements
available online. If so, there may be no need to keep a copy of the adap-
tation; rather, the user may simply recreate it each time she goes online.
Indeed, for products like the Game Genie, the latter course may be pref-
erable, because each time the user accesses the Game Genie or similar
program, she may create a different alteration to the underlying game.
In that case, there may be a third category of conduct-repeated time-
86. Cf. 17 U.s.c. § 117 (permitting owners of copies of computer programs to make
copies or adaptations of the program, provided "that such a new copy or adaptation is
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with
a machine and that it is used in no other manner").
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shifting of the same material-whose economic impact may be the same
as librarying.
87
In sum, the derivative works rights of the author of a work created or
posted in cyberspace should extend in principle to third parties' dissemi-
nation not only of fully realized adaptations, but also of work-specific
components designed for users' incorporation with the underlying work.
There are important corollaries to this principle. First, the third-party
creator of a general purpose work, such as a translation program or a
graphics program, should not be liable to the author of the underlying
work if users employ these tools. A general purpose third-party work
lends itself to too many "substantial non-infringing uses"88 tojustify liabil-
ity for contributory infringement. Thus, for example, the purveyor of the
graphics program should incur no liability if a reader of our initiating
author's collection of variously-ended stories downloaded the work and
added images generated with the aid of the program.
Second, the end user's liability for direct infringement of the deriva-
tive works right would turn on fair use considerations. If the user has
created an unauthorized derivative work, there is a prima facie violation
of the author's exclusive rights. The fair use doctrine would excuse this
violation if, most importantly, the creation of the derivative work
threatened no significant economic consequences to the underlying
work.89 Evaluation of economic impact may turn on whether or not the
user further disseminates the unauthorized derivative work. Thus, for ex-
ample, if a user of our hypothetical story collection translated the work
into Portuguese for his private enjoyment and edification, no infringe-
ment should be found. If, however, the user instead posted the transla-
tion to a generally accessible bulletin board, then infringement should be
found.90
We have seen the contexts in which the reproduction, public per-
formance and display, distribution, and derivative works rights can apply
to cyberspace. But we have not yet explored how our initiating author
will be able to enforce those rights. If indeed the predominant exploita-
87. Cf. Sony, 464 U.S. at 485-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the economic
impact of "time-shifting").
88. See id. at 442.
89. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (fourth
fair use factor, potential economic harm, is "undoubtedly the single most important
element").
90. If the user posts the translation to a few friends or to a small online Portguese-
language reading group, the fair use inquiry becomes more difficult. Arguably, the
dissemination of the translation would remain sufficiently discrete to warrant application
of the fair use exception. However, once the translation is posted in cyberspace, its
proclivity to further dissemination may be too great to ignore its potential economic
impact. See text accompanying notes 53-61, on "public" performances in cyberspace.
For a discussion of whether the bulletin board or online service that carries the
translation should also be liable, see infra text accompanying notes 107-117.
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don of online works will be by the end users, how can a copyright owner
police her rights?
III. -ENFORCEMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN CYBERSPACE
Copyright owners have traditionally avoided targeting end users of
copyrighted works. This is in part because pursuing the ultimate con-
sumer is costly and unpopular. But the primary reason has been because
end users did not copy works of authorship-or if they did copy, the re-
production was insignificant and rarely the subject of widespread further
dissemination. Rather, the entities creating and disseminating copies (or
public performances or displays) were intermediaries between the cre-
ators and the consumers: for example, publishers, motion picture produ-
cers, and producers of phonograms. Infringements, rather than being
spread throughout the user population, were concentrated higher up the
chain of distribution of works. Pursuing the intermediary therefore of-
fered the most effective way to enforce copyright interests. By contrast, in
cyberspace individuals will often commit the unauthorized acts, both for
private consumption and for further dissemination to other individuals.
Can there be meaningful, and palatable, copyright enforcement against
individuals? Alternatively, will there still be intermediaries worth
pursuing?
Some of the hypotheticals we have examined retained the presence
of intermediaries-such as producers of components destined for con-
sumer incorporation into derivative works-whom the copyright owner
can locate and pursue in much the same way as copyright owners pursue
unauthorized exploiters in the analog world. There are also other in-
stances in which intermediaries persist, facilitating copyright enforce-
ment. Most notably, authors and other copyright owners may be able to
work with commercial online services to control the gate between author
and public. The author, through the service, can impose contractual ac-
cess and payment conditions on subscribers; the service may also imple-
ment technological impediments to unauthorized copying or
redistribution.9 1
But if a work is disseminated without authorization on an unpoliced
bulletin board or network, or if an online service declines to assume re-
sponsibility for monitoring what is placed on its network, the task of the
copyright owner to discover and combat infringements seems overwhelm-
ing. Two complementary approaches may alleviate this problem. First,
authors may form, or seek the assistance of already formed, collective li-
censing societies. Second, bulletin board operators and online services
91. See, e.g., Karen Rodriguez, Vendors Rally to Secure Internet; Encryption-Based
Systems Readied, InfoWorld, Jan. 30, 1995, at 14; General Terms and Conditions for Use of




may be held directly or vicariously liable for the unauthorized dissemina-
tion of copyrighted works.
A. Collective Licensing
Two principal characteristics of the market for works in cyberspace
make enforcement daunting: users are extremely numerous, and they
are widely dispersed.92 Nonetheless, this situation has low tech analogies.
A similar problem has existed since the mid-nineteenth century with re-
spect to the public performance of musical works. No one composer or
publisher can find and license (or, failing a license, sue) every commer-
cial music user, from restaurants, to retail establishments, to clubs, to con-
cert halls, to broadcasters, etc. But the composers and publishers can
pool their copyrights for collective licensing, and delegate the policing
function to the collective licensing organization. Users get the right to
perform all the music covered by the blanket license, and the authors and
copyright owners create an organization with the resources needed to
enforce the performance rights against uncooperative users.
95
The music performance rights collectives are private law creations in
the United States and, for the most part, abroad.94 The rights holders
have chosen to form the collectives; no composer or publisher is legally
obligated to join them. But not all copyright sectors have formed collec-
tives as pervasively or as willingly, despite the compelling economic incen-
tives for doing so. In the United States, the copyright owners of literary
works, for example, have traditionally been reluctant to give up control
over rights and permissions to copy in favor of collective licensing of pho-
tocopy rights.95 Nonetheless, judicial and legislative activity in the United
92. In addition, piratical users may be difficult to identify if they operate anonymously
or under a pseudonym.
93. On collective licensing, particularly as practiced by the music performing rights
organizations, see generally Stanley M. Besen & Sheila N. Kirby, Compensating Creators of
Intellectual Property: Collectives That Collect at iii (1989) (examining the role of
performance and reproduction rights organizations in the United States and other
developed countries when "decentralized use makes individual enforcement of ...
property rights uneconomic."); Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Collective
Administration of Copyright (1995) (colloquium held October 31, 1994 in Toronto);
Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and Performing
Rights Societies, 3J. Copyright Soc'y 332, 848 (1986) (reviewing the "development of the
performing right in music and the operation of ASCAP, the oldest and largest performing
rights society in the United States").
94. See generally Besen & Kirby, supra note 93, at 15-44 (surveying domestic and
foreign performance rights collectives).
95. See generally id. at 45-63 (discussing reproductive rights organizations);
Ferdinand Melichar, Collective Administration of Electronic Rights-A Realistic Option?,
Address before Academy Colloquium: The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment
(colloquium heldJuly 5-7, 1995 in Amsterdam) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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States and abroad points toward (or mandates) greater inclusion of liter-
ary works in the collective licensing repertory.96
For example, in a U.S. decision of primary importance both for its
determination of copyright liability for photocopying and for its endorse-
ment of collective licensing, the Second Circuit recently ruled that
Texaco violated the copyright in the Journal of Catalysis when one of its
research scientists made and retained copies of articles from the jour-
nal.97 The court rejected Texaco's fair use defense, holding (inter alia)
that the copying diverted the market for the journal because the copy-
right owner could have licensed photocopying rights to Texaco. Acquir-
ing a license would have been "administratively tolerable"98 for Texaco,
because the plaintiff publisher had made its works available for licensing
through the Copyright Clearance Center, a photocopy rights collective
that represents scientific and technical journal publishers. The Second
Circuit suggested that the fair use analysis might be different if the copy-
right owner were not making its works available for licensing.99 In that
event, indicated the court, it might even be appropriate for the court to
impose a license that would compensate the copyright owner for the
copying, but that would enable the defendant to make the copies without
obtaining consent.100
As a result, Texaco makes user friendly licensing both a carrot and a
stick for copyright owners. If the copyright owner can offer the user a
collective or other administratively tolerable form of license, 101 then fair
96. For an argument that collective licensing should become the predominant form
of compensation for authors of works of visual art (and, by implication, for copyright
owners in general) see Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in
Authorial Control Over Copyrighted Works, 42J. Copyright Soc'y 93, 115-25 (1994).
97. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d. Cir. 1994). The
claim against Texaco involved systematic copying by hundreds of research scientists, but,
for purposes of ruling on the fair use defense, the parties agreed to limit the record to one
scientist's copying. See id. at 915.
98. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(Leval, J.), aff'd, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), order amended and superseded, 60 F.3d 913
(2d Cir. 1995).
99. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931.
100. Id. at 932 n.19, citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 n.10
(1994) (indicating that injunctive relief for copyright infringement may not always be
appropriate, and that a continuing award of damages may in some circumstances best
accommodate the rights of the copyright holder and the public's interest in access to
unauthorized transformations of the plaintiff's work).
101. For example, the Copyright Office is currently enhancing its online database of
copyright registrations to include information about obtaining licenses. The Copyright
Office's project envisions an online clearance procedure that would make it possible for
users to ascertain the status and ownership of a work, to obtain permission, and to pay for
the use, all at the push of a few buttons. See, e.g., U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Office
Electronic Registration, Recordation & Deposit System (1995); Guy Lamolinara, Copyright
in the Digital Age: CORDS Project to Make Registration, Verification Easier, 54 Library of
Congress Information Bulletin 267, 267 (1995); Eric Schwartz, The Herbert Tenzer
Memorial Conference: Copyright in the Twenty-First Century. The Role of the Copyright
Office in the Age of Information, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ. 69 (1994); see also Nil White
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use claims whose primary justifications are burdensomeness or lack of
economic impact on copyright exploitation may well be foreclosed.10 2
On the other hand, if copyright owners do not facilitate licensing, then a
court may step in and in effect grant the license anyway-on terms that
the copyright owner will not have set. This result compromises copyright
owners' rights to decide whether and to whom to license reproduction
rights, but less so than would application of the fair use exception, which
would deprive the copyright owner of both control and compensation.
03
Some foreign jurisdictions have adopted stronger measures to pro-
mote collective licensing. In the Nordic countries, the "extended collec-
tive license" provisions of the copyright laws force holdout publishers into
the reproduction rights collective once a "substantial portion" of national
authors or publishers within a particular field have joined the collective
licensing organization. 0 4 In France, a law promulgated in January 1995
provides that "publication of a work entails the transfer, of the right to
reproduce by photocopying to [an approved collective licensing] society.
Only approved societies may contract with users for the purpose of man-
aging the right thus transferred... ."105 Thus, copyright holders covered
by these laws have no choice but to cede photocopying rights to collec-
tives that will grant blanket licenses covering the repertoire. In return,
the copyright owners will be compensated according to the particular
country's licensing fee formula. 0 6
Paper, supra note 39, at 191-94, 235-36 (recommending measures to promote "Copyright
Management Information").
102. Market failure is not the onlyjustification for fair use claims. In some cases, even
if the copyright owner could license the use, copyright policy favors freeing the use from
the copyright owner's control. Criticism and parody are leading examples of these kinds
of uses: we would not want to limit the available commentary on works of authorship to
authorized book reviews and licensed parodies. An authorized book review would be even
more suspect than an authorized biography, and a licensed parody seems an oxymoron.
103. The Copyright Clearance Center and the Folio Corporation have announced
their intention to form an alliance to promote widescale electronic clearance, billing, and
distribution systems for local and wide-area digital networks (including Internet). See
Folio Corp. & Copyright Clearance Ctr., Press Release, Mar. 6, 1995 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
104. See generally Gunnar Karnell, Extended Collective License Clauses and
Agreements in Nordic Copyright aw, 10 Colum.-VLAJ.L. &Arts 73 (1985) (describing the
extent and functioning of extended collective license systems in the Nordic countries).
105. C. Prop. Intell. art. L 122-10 (1995) (Fr.).
106. See generallyJane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University
Research or Teaching, 39J. Copyright Soc'y 181, 192-98 (1992) (discussing legal licensing
regimes in foreign countries) and works cited therein.
The fuller development of licensing collectives abroad may be due to a variety of
additional factors as well. First, such collectives have existed for a longer time in other
countries. Second, there may be fewer antitrust constraints on the price fixing that
collective licensing often implies. Third, in many countries, the government promotes or
supervises collective licensing organizations. See generally, Besen & Kirby, supra note 98
(discussing copyright collectives throughout world).
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How would these models apply in cyberspace? A collective could as-
sume (or at least assist in discharging) the burden of monitoring elec-
tronic bulletin boards and networks to discover unauthorized postings of
its members' works. The burden would be substantial, however, since the
content of cyberspace changes by the second, and new unlicensed post-
ings will inevitably follow hard upon each perusal.
Even were monitoring feasible, whom would the collectives license?
Despite the collectives' strength and resources, it could still be impracti-
cal to seek out and contract with individual users (or to pursue them,
except perhaps on an occasional in terrorem basis). Rather, the likely
targets of licensing and of infringement suits will be the persons or enti-
ties who make available and control the electronic fora for communica-
tion of unauthorized copies, displays, or derivative works: that is, the bul-
letin board services and the network operators.
B. Liability of Online Services for Copyright Infringement
The liability of online services for copyright infringements commit-
ted on "their" networks or bulletin boards sparks much controversy-at
least from the point of view of the service providers, who do not wish to
bear the burden of monitoring the copyright compliance of their sub-
scribers.' 0 7 After all, in many cases, the services did not initiate the unau-
thorized copying or communication; they simply provided the means by
which another party could disseminate the infringement to the public.
However, the principle that parties who provide the fora of communica-
tion of infringement are also liable for copyright infringement is not new
to copyright law. In fact, it is the cornerstone of many of the collective
licensing and copyright enforcement activities of societies such as ASCAP
and BMI (and their foreign analogues). ASCAP, the American Society of
Composers Authors and Publishers, and BMI, Broadcast Music Inc., li-
cense their members' public performance rights, and initiate suits against
users who decline to take the licenses. For example, the music perform-
107. On copyright liability for bulletin boards and online services, see generally Nil
White Paper, supra note 39, at 114-24 (reviewing current status of online service provider
liability, and recommending against a diminution of the services' liability); Charles
Cangialosi, The Electronic Underground: Computer Piracy and Electronic Bulletin
Boards, 15 Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ. 265 (1989) (examining bulletin board services
systems operator's liability for copyright infringement); Hardy, supra note 1 (evaluating
alternative analyses of the emerging law of cyberspace); Loundy, supra note 1 (discussing
legal issues related to copyright and computer information systems in cyberspace);
Jonathan Gilber, Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Misuse, 54
Fordham L. Rev. 439 (1985) (proposing deterrent and mitigation measures against illegal
bulletin board use).
On the related topic of liability of online services for defamation committed by
subscribers, compare Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(declining to hold service liable for subscribers' online defamatory statements) with
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1795 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding service liable because Prodigy exercises some degree of
control over the content of postings to its network).
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ance rights societies license the venues in which live music is played (such
as concert halls, jazz clubs, bars with live bands, etc.); they do not license
the musicians.' 08 The courts have confirmed the liability of the owners
or managers of the restaurants and similar places that engage the per-
formers of the music.'0 9
Moreover, while restaurants that hire musicians to entertain the din-
ers might be considered the employers of the performers, the doctrine of
vicarious liability in copyright law extends beyond the master-servant rela-
tionship. As the Second Circuit held in 1963:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted
materials-even in the absence of actual knowledge that the
copyright monopoly is being impaired-the purposes of copy-
right law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability
upon the beneficiary of that exploitation. n0
Economic policy considerations supply the rationale for the doctrine of
vicarious liability in copyright: the party having the "right and ability to
supervise" is best situated to pay for-or better, to prevent-infringe-
ment. Judge Keeton has recently elaborated the point:
The enterprise and the person profiting from it are better able
than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose
act caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to
others who have profited from the enterprise. In addition, plac-
ing responsibility for the loss on the enterprise has the added
benefit of creating a greater incentive for the enterprise to po-
lice its operations carefully to avoid unnecessary losses."'
108. See, e.g., Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 93, at 358-59.
109. See, e.g., Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (Holmes, J.) (orchestra
performing popular songs in restaurant); see also Polygram Intl Publishing v. Nevada/
TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (D. Mass. 1994) (Keeton, J.) (distinguishing direct
liability of performer from vicarious or contributory liability of party hiring the
performer).
110. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)
(liability of department store-that had not obtained music performance right license-
for violation of public performance right when one of its concessioners played
phonograph record of plaintiff's music).
111. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325 (liability of organizer of computer software trade
show who had declined to take ASCAP license, when exhibitors at show were alleged to
have performed copyrighted music at their booths). But see Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed
Publishing, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (refusing to find trade show
organizers liable for some exhibitors' unlicensed public performance of copyrighted
music); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (no
liability for organizer of swap meet who rented booths to vendors of counterfeit
audiotapes). In both cases, the courts found that the defendants lacked the power to
supervise and control the exhibitors' activities.
The NII White Paper's analysis resembles Judge Keeton's: "On-line service providers
have a business relationship with their subscribers. They-and, perhaps, only they-are in
the position to know the identity and activities of their subscribers and to stop unlawful
activities.... They are in a better position to prevent or stop infringement than the
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Where a commercial online service is concerned, the "direct finan-
cial interest" test should be satisfied. This is particularly clear if the ser-
vice is set up as a forum for the communication and exchange of copy-
righted material. But even where the transmission of copyrighted works
is incidental to the service, the standard may continue to apply, especially
if the availability of copyrighted works on the network enhances the ser-
vice's appeal to potential subscribers.112 On the other hand, under this
standard, it is less likely that the operator of a nonprofit bulletin board or
network would face similar liability for its users' piracy.118 As for the
"right and ability to supervise" component, the nature of the digital com-
munications forum may also be significant. While some fora appear to be
rather anarchic, 14 others are more closely controlled, at least with regard
to some elements of their content, such as pornography and obscene, or
even merely disrespectful, language. 115
Finally, entrepreneurs may incur direct, as well as vicarious, liability.
As a result of the technology of communication on digital networks (at
least for now), the online service or bulletin board is itself engaging in
acts of copyright exploitation. When a user posts a work on the bulletin
board, a "copy" of the work is made in the service's server.116 When the
work is communicated to subscribers, it is "publicly performed or dis-
played" on their screens.117
copyright owner. Between these two relatively innocent parties, the best policy is to hold
the service provider liable." NIl White Paper, supra note 39, at 117.
112. For example, in Polygram, 855 F. Supp. 1314, the exhibitors were not performing
the music in order to sell recordings (as was the case in H.L. Green), but in order to attract
customers to their booths, where they sold computer software and related goods.
113. Under this analysis, the universities and government agencies whose servers form
the bulk of the Internet, a noncommercial, unmonitored series of networks, would not be
vicariously liable for infringements transmitted on the Internet. On the other hand,
commercial services offering connections to the Internet could be vicariously liable if an
infringing communication to the Internet originated with a subscriber to the commercial
service.
114. See, e.g., John P. Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking
Patents & Copyrights in the Digital Age (EverythingYou Know About Intellectual Property
is Wrong), Wired, Mar. 1994, at 85-86 (describing present and future dilemma imposed by
the "unbounded and perhaps permanently lawless waves of cyberspace").
115. See, e.g., America Online, Terms of Service §§ 1.3, 2.5, 4.2, 8.2, available in
America Online, "Member's Services" Area, "Members' Online Support" Department
(stating that members agree to a code of conduct and America Online can restrict their
transmissions or expel them if code is violated); Geoffirey Moore, The First Amendment Is
Safe at Prodigy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1990, § 3, at 13 (explaining why Prodigy should and
does edit the contents of its electronic bulletin board); Matthew L. Wald, A Child's
Internet Sins Visited on the Parent, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1995, § 4, at 2 (describing instance
in which adults were excluded from America Online after their children committed
"infractions"); cf. Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L Rep. (BNA)
1794, 1798 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (online provider's exercise of control over
network justified liability for user's defamatory statements).
116. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 89-42.




Finally, the ubiquitous nature of online delivery requires considera-
tion of multinational enforcement. This raises international conflict of
laws questions. In principle, there is no such thing as "international copy-
right"; instead, there are a multiplicity of national copyright regimes."x 8
However, the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions and the TRIPs
accord impose certain substantive minimum standards to which member
countries must conform their domestic copyright laws (at least with re-
spect to protection of foreign copyright owners),119 These treaties also
link the member countries through imposition of the nondiscrimination
rule of national treatment, which requires member countries to treat
works from other member countries as if they were local works.
120
The assimilation of foreigners to domestic copyright owners con-
firms the territorial character of international copyright. An author and
international copyright owner possesses no extra-conventional supra-na-
In addition, were the Copyright Act amendments recommended by the Nil White
Paper to be enacted, communication to subscribers would also be a "transmission of
copies" subject to the § 106(3) distribution right. See Ni White Paper, supra note 39, at
213-20, app. 1, at 2.
There have been two decisions concerning bulletin board services' liability for copying
and disseminating protected material. In both instances, the courts held the services
directly liable for copyright infringement. In Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552,
1555-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993), a federal district court sustained an infringement claim against a
bulletin board service when one of its subscribers systematically scanned and uploaded
Playboy centerfolds. In Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921 (N.D. Cal.
1994), the service itself was directly encouraging its subscribers' unlicensed posting of
copies of videogames.
A pending action, Frank Music v. CompuServe, No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,
1993), may afford greater guidance on the application of vicarious liability to a network
operator who claims that its role in the communication of infringing materials on a
bulletin board was too passive to give rise to liability for any kind of copyright
infringement.
The NII White Paper cites another claim pending against a Bulletin Board operator
and an Internet access provider, Religious Technology Center v. NETCOM, No. C95-20091
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 3, 1995). See NII White Paper, supra note 39, at 121-22 & n.391.
118. SeeJon A. Baumgarten, Primer on the Principles of International Copyright, in
Fourth Annual U.S. Copyright Office Speaks: Contemporary Copyright and Intellectual
Property Issues 470, 471 (1992) ("The term 'international copyright' is something of a
misnomer, for neither a single code governing copyright protection across national
borders, nor a unitary multi-national property right, exists. What does exist is a complex of
copyright relations among sovereign states, each having its own copyright law applicable to
acts within its territory.").
119. See Berne Convention, supra note 47, arts. 5, 6bis, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, at
41; Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, arts. 1-7, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1344-63;
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, arts. 9-14, 33 I.L.M. 83 (1994).
120. See Berne Convention, supra note 47, art. 5(2), S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, at 40;
Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 119, art. II; see also Sam Ricketson, The
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986,




tional rights; she-is instead, and at once, the proprietor of a French copy-
right, a U.S. copyright, a Mexican copyright, ajapanese copyright, and so
on. Thus, unauthorized copying of the author's work in each of these
countries would give rise to an action for the violation of the local copy-
right law. Distribution of copies of an infringing work would be judged
under the copyright laws of each country where copies were dissemi-
nated. Similarly, unauthorized public performance of a song on the ra-
dio would be analyzed under the laws of each country receiving the
broadcast.
This approach may pose problems in cyberspace. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that a hacker in Thailand gained access to and copied the entirety
of our initiating author's collection of variously-ended stories, and had
posted it on "Cyberworld," a (hypothetical) Canadian-headquartered
commercial service. True to its name, Cyberworld can be accessed from
anywhere in the world, and subscribers in France, Mexico, China and the
United States do indeed download the collection. We will further assume
that it is not worthwhile to pursue the individual international
downloaders. If our author sues Cyberworld in the United States, appli-
cation of the principle of territoriality would mean that the forum would
be obliged to apply scores of foreign laws, in addition to its own copyright
law.121 Such an exercise could prove daunting, particularly if the applica-
ble laws differ significantly. Substantive differences between potentially
applicable national laws are likely to occur in many of the areas this Arti-
cle has considered, including ownership of copyright interests in the
work, existence and scope of exclusive rights in the work,122 and exist-
ence and scope of liability of online services for either direct or indirect
infringements. 23
In the United States, some courts have simplified the choice of law
problem by applying U.S. law to the entirety of a multinational infringe-
ment claim when the root act of copying occurred in the United
States.124 From this viewpoint, the extraterritorial infringements are all
the direct consequences of a local U.S. infringement. Where, as in the
hypothetical, however, the extraterritorial infringements cannot be
rooted in a U.S. violation of copyright, U.S. law might not apply to alleg-
121. The NIl White Paper confirms the application of U.S. law to the unauthorized
dissemination of copies in the United States by recommending that the Copyright Act's
importation provision be amended to specify that unauthorized transmission of copies into
the United States violates the copyright owner's exclusive rights. See NI White Paper,
supra note 39, at 107-09, 221.
122. Moreover, in many foreign countries, authors' exclusive rights include not only
economic rights, but the "moral rights" to preserve the integrity of the work and receive
authorship credit for the work. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 47, art. 6bis, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, at 41; C. Prop. Intell. art. L 121-1 (1992) (Fr.).
123. For a fuller discussion of these problems, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/
Territorial Rights: Private International Law Questions of the Global Information
Infrastructure, 42J. Copyright Soc'y 318 (1995).
124. See Update Art v. Modiin Publishing, 843 F.2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1988).
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edly infringing acts occurring beyond U.S. borders. Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, having determined that a defendant's mere "authorization" in the
United States to reproduce copies without the copyright owner's permis-
sion was not itself a violation of U.S. copyright law, further held that the
making of the reproductions abroad similarly did not infringe the U.S.
copyright. l 5
As a middle ground, U.S. copyright law might apply to unauthorized
reproductions occurring abroad if U.S. shores appear designed to be the
ultimate destination of the foreign-made copies. 126 In practice, however,
the middle ground may vastly expand: since cyberspace reaches every-
place, copyright infringements will almost inevitably come to U.S. shores,
no matter what the point of origin of the communication, or whom the
initial intended audience. The person or entity posting a work on a digi-
tal network in effect knows, or should know, that the U.S. will be a likely
destination for the work. It may therefore be appropriate to distinguish
between transmissions targeting U.S. recipients, and those for which the
United States is an incidental stop in the stream of cyberspace.
127
The root act or master copy approach to choice of law resembles that
of the European Union's Satellite Directive, which designates the law of
the country of "uplink" to govern liability for dissemination of programs
by satellite. 128 Although the satellite signal can be received in many
countries, the multinational communication can be traced to a single
125. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1091-94,
1096-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994). Defendant, from its California
offices, allegedly licensed the reproduction and distribution of videocassettes of Yellow
Submarine around the world; the Court held that the claim as to licenses for reproduction
and distribution outside the United States was not cognizable under the Copyright Act. Id.
at 1090.
Moreover, even where infringements allegedly occurred in U.S. territory, the Ninth
Circuit has dismissed a copyright claim on forum non conviens grounds when the parties
were not U.S. nationals, when the work allegedly infringed in the United States was first
published outside the United States, and when the court believed that the U.S. claims
could be properly adjudicated in the country of the work's origin and of the parties'
nationality (Singapore). See Creative Technology Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE Ltd., 61 F.3d
696, 701-704. In dissentJudge Ferguson was "astounded... that it is not convenient to try
an American copyright case in an American court for copyright infringement that takes
place solely in America." Id. at 705 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Metzke v. May Dep't Stores, 878 F. Supp. 756, 761 (W.D. Pa. 1995)
(offshore copying may violate U.S. copyright law if defendant commissioning the making
of unauthorized copies abroad knew, or should have known, that copies would be sold in
United States); see also Nintendo of America v. Aeropower Co., 84 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding overbroad an injunction against sales by Taiwanese manufacturer of
unauthorized copies of Nintendo videogames in Mexico and Canada, but suggesting the
injunction should have been drawn to enjoin Mexican and Canadian sales of copies that
were likely to reach the United States).
127. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980)
(sending goods into general stream of commerce, without further purposeful targeting or
anticipation of arrival of goods in forum, held not sufficient to satisfy due process
requirements of assertion of personal jurisdiction over out of state car dealer).
128. See Council Directive 93/83, pmbl. 14, art. 1.2(b), 1998 O.J. (L 248) 19.
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point of departure. In cyberspace terms, the place of the root act or
uplink could be called the country of the "upload."
Designation of the law of the country of upload to judge alleged in-
fringements occurring throughout the world would appear to enjoy the
virtue of simplicity. However, it also shares the vice of manipulability.129
The approach may work in the European Union because all member
countries must adhere to a minimum standard of protection.'3 0 If the
approach is extended to the whole world, however, cyberpirates will sim-
ply make sure they post the unauthorized copies from, or locate their
services in, a country having an extremely lax intellectual property re-
gime. Perhaps, just as certain nations have become the venue of choice
for entrepreneurs seeking maximum banking secrecy and minimum
taxes, some nations will endeavor to enhance the local economy by at-
tracting professional infringers to their copyright-free shores.' 31 Without
a serious minimum standard applicable to all nations, or without a pirate
nation exception from the application of the law of the upload, no choice
of law approach will completely avoid this problem. 3 2
CONCLUSION
Cyberspace creators like our initiating author, and authors of previ-
ously created works subsequently posted in cyberspace, enjoy rights
whose effective enforcement in cyberspace is today rather uncertain. Col-
lective licensing could enhance the likelihood that authors would at least
be compensated for copying (and public performance and display, or
even derivative works). However, for many kinds of works of authorship,
the collectives that would license electronic rights are only in the early
129. Moreover, it may not always be simple to identify the country of upload; in some
instances, the communication may emanate from more than one country. For example,
our hypothetical initiating author may receive contributions to her collection of stories
from participants in many different countries.
130. See Proposal for a Council Directive, Explanatory Memorandum, COM(91)276
final at 4, 26-29 (establishment of common level of protection for copyright and
neighboring rights is necessary component of EC Satellite Directive).
131. Cf. id. at 4 (explaining that harmonization is necessary in order to avoid creation
of "copyright havens").
132. See Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws § 4.3.2 (1995).
Arguably, article 5.2 of the Berne Convention does not in fact mandate application of
the law of each place of infringement. See A. Lucas & H. J. Lucas, Trait6 de la Propri&6
Litt~raire et Artistique §§ 1066-1074 (1994) (raising, but rejecting, this interpretation).
Rather, in designating the application of the law of the country "where protection is
sought," the treaty is referring not to the places where the acts against which the copyright
owner is seeking protection occurred, but rather to the forum country. After all, it is
before the courts of that country that the copyright owner is seeking protection. Under
this interpretation, a single law-that of the forum-would apply to the entirety of
multinational infringements. This apparently would be the case even if no infringements
were alleged to have occurred within the forum: there may be an independent basis, such
as defendant's domicile, for a given country to be made the forum.
For a fuller discussion of the conflicts of law problem, see Ginsburg, Global Use/
Territorial Rights, supra note 123, at 330-35.
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stages of formation, at least in the United States. Resistance to collective
licensing has persisted, notably among publishers of traditional literary
works, primarily because collective licensing implies the surrender of con-
trol over the selection and activities of its licensees. While some might
think that in a networked environment any such control is illusory, others
are extremely (not to say, unduly) optimistic that the online medium,
combined with encryption technologies, will in fact afford copyright own-
ers more control than they enjoyed in the analog world.
133
Moreover, in many if not most instances, enforcement, whether by a
collective or individually by our initiating author, will not be meaningful
unless its target is a profitable intermediary, such as a bulletin board or
commercial network operator. The effectiveness of pursuing the online
provider will in turn depend on what national law (or laws) applies to
determine liability for infringements created and/or carried online.
Finally, the "information superhighway" will undoubtedly carry a
great deal of "information," but transmitting information is not the same
as conveying authorship.'3 The viability of cyberspace as a medium for
the consensual communication and creation of sustained works of au-
thorship-real "cars," not simply conversations, data of the day, or pi-
rated postings-will depend on authors' and copyright owners' confi-
dence that the kinds of questions raised in this Article will find solutions
that will meet the needs of both authors and users.
133. See, e.g., Lance Rose, The Emperor's Clothes Still FitJust Fine, Wired, Feb. 1995,
at 103, 104:
Net cops can swiftly clean each new infringement out of the major online markets
as soon as it appears. They will soon become better at it when copyright owners
begin deploying software agents that can roam the entire Net, searching out
anonymous infringements. Every time a pirated work is spread to the four
comers of the Internet by an anonymous user, software agents will quickly sniff it
out.
134. See, e.g., Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (useful
and informative telephone white pages lacks sufficient originality to be considered a work
of authorship).
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